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Gitomer: Confrontation Clause

TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS: THE DEATH OF DYING
DECLARATIONS?
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Clay1
(decided June 28, 2011)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Clay and Sidor Fulcher were convicted of murder in
the second degree by a jury in the Supreme Court of New York,
Kings County.2 Clay appealed, claiming that the trial court erred
when they permitted a police officer to testify in court to a statement
made by the victim, allegedly violating defendant‟s Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause.3 The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
bars testimonial hearsay evidence from being introduced in a criminal
trial against a criminal defendant unless the prosecutor puts the outof-court declarant on the stand as a witness subject to cross examination or, alternatively, the prosecutor may show the declarant is presently unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to confront the declarant.4 Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State

1

926 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011).
Id. at 601.
3
Id.
4
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant
part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id.; see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (noting that the declarant may only be a witness under the meaning of the Confrontation Clause if the statement is testimonial); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
2

953
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Constitution contains a parallel provision.5 Clay stated that the admission of the officer‟s testimony into evidence violated his constitutional rights under both the federal and state constitutions.6
The Appellate Division, Second Department held that a
statement made by the victim of a shooting who did not think he
would survive to a late-arriving police officer was testimonial in nature, but the Confrontation Clause recognizes an exception for dying
declarations.7 The victim was shot six times, had difficulty speaking,
and was informed by a police officer that he doubted his chance of
survival.8 Under these conditions, the victim made a statement to the
police identifying his assailant.9 The court held that the statement
was made under the threat of imminent death; therefore, the statement was admissible in court as a dying declaration, and did not violate the Confrontation Clause.10

II.

THE FACTS OF PEOPLE V. CLAY

Clay and Fulcher were convicted by a jury of murder in the
second degree.11 On August 11, 2006, at approximately nine o‟clock
at night, both Clay and Fulcher approached Igol Isaacs on a local
street in Brooklyn.12 The defendants shot Isaacs six times with the
bullets entering his abdomen, back, “kidney, liver, and small and
large intestines.”13 The bullets also “fractured two vertebrae and the
spinal cord, and passed into his chest cavity, perforating the middle
and lower lobes of the right lung.”14 Police Captain Brian McGee re-

5

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article 1, Section 6 of the New York Constitution provides, in
relevant part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” Id.
6
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 610.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 610-11.
11
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601. Although both defendants initially contended that the
statement by Isaacs violated their rights under the Confrontation clause, the appeal only concerns the statement made against Thomas Clay. Id.
12
Id. at 600-01.
13
Id. at 610.
14
Id.
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sponded to the request for assistance at the location of the shooting.15
When McGee arrived at the scene of the crime, a police van and other
officers were already present.16 Without stopping to speak with any
of the other officers, McGee moved directly toward Isaacs, who was
on the ground “lying face-up on the sidewalk” next to a police officer.17
McGee asked Isaacs, “Who shot you?”18 When Isaacs did not
respond, McGee informed him that it was unlikely he would survive
the gunshot wounds, and asked for the name of the perpetrator
again.19 Isaacs said, “Todd shot me.”20 In an attempt to confirm the
identity of the shooter, McGee inquired, “Todd shot you?”21 Isaacs
was gasping for air and with his final words he uttered, “No. No.
Tom shot me. Tom. Tom.”22 Isaacs had severe trouble breathing
and was unable to speak any further.23 McGee questioned Isaacs for
Tom‟s last name but failed to receive a response from the mortally
wounded victim.24 Then, McGee spoke with another officer but did
not discuss the conversation with Isaacs and pushed back a crowd of
people in order to prevent contamination of the crime scene.25 Isaacs
was rushed to the hospital and died a few hours later.26 That same
night, Yvette Clay contacted the police and stated that she witnessed
her estranged husband Thomas Clay and his cousin Sidor Fulcher
shoot Isaacs.27 The police recovered seven .9 millimeter shell casings
and one discharged .45 caliber shell casing at the scene of the
crime.28

15

Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. The court recognized that there were no medical personnel on the scene at the time
who could have disclosed an opinion as to Isaacs‟ condition. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
20
Id. at 600-01.
21
Id. at 601.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
25
Id. The facts indicate that a crowd of people gathered at the scene of the incident and
Officer McGee sought to find any possible witness to the crime. Id. at 606.
26
Id. at 601.
27
Id.
28
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601. All the shell casings at the crime scene were “found to have
been fired from the same gun.” Id.
16
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Clay and Fulcher were indicted on multiple charges, including
“one count of murder in the second degree . . . and were jointly tried
before a jury.”29 Before trial, counsel for both defendants objected to
admission of Officer McGee‟s testimony on the ground that it would
violate the defendants‟ rights under the Sixth Amendment.30 The
New York Supreme Court held that the statements made by Isaacs to
Officer McGee were not testimonial.31 The court admitted the testimony of Officer McGee into evidence under the dying declaration
exception to hearsay.32 The court held that the statements made by
Isaacs shortly before his death were not barred by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.33 Ultimately, Officer McGee testified at trial to the statements made by the mortally wounded Isaacs
the night of the shooting.34 The jury convicted both defendants of
murder in the second degree.35
Clay appealed the decision on the grounds that it was a constitutional error to allow McGee to testify to the conversation with
Isaacs which identified “Tom” as the shooter.36 The Appellate Division, Second Department agreed with the New York Supreme Court‟s
decision to permit the testimony into evidence as a dying declaration,
and affirmed the judgment.37

III.

REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE PEOPLE V.
CLAY DECISION
A.

Confrontation Clause

The court began its opinion by determining whether the
29

Id.
Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36).
31
Id.
32
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. The appellant did not argue that the State Constitution is more protective of the
right of confrontation than the United States Constitution; however, the court based the analysis on relevant New York case law. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (citing People v. Bradley,
862 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 2006)).
37
Id. at 601.
30
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statements made by Isaacs to Officer McGee were testimonial.38 The
analysis used by the court was set forth in Davis v. Washington,39
where the United States Supreme Court looked to the primary purpose of the interrogation and whether statements made by the declarant were intended to be used for criminal prosecution.40 When
McGee arrived at the scene, he immediately approached Isaacs and
asked one very specific question, “Who shot you?”41 This was a
pointed question, designed only to learn the identity of the perpetrator.42 The court noted that, “[n]o such precautionary or remedial purpose can reasonably be attributed to McGee‟s inquiry as demonstrated most prominently by the remainder of the conversation.”43 McGee
informed Isaacs, “I don‟t think you are going to make it” and repeatedly asked who shot him.44 These facts indicate that McGee was not
trying to assist with an ongoing emergency, but rather to give Isaacs a
final opportunity to disclose the identity of the assailants.45 After
McGee learned the identity of the shooter, he sought to locate and secure evidence as well as find any witness to the crime.46
While the United States Supreme Court recognized in Davis
that initial inquiries made by police officers tend to produce nontestimonial statements, it explicitly acknowledged that statements ascertained at crime scene under certain circumstances are testimonial.47 McGee questioned Isaacs at the crime scene shortly after the
shooting occurred but the court held that “the totality of the surrounding circumstances objectively indicates that McGee‟s primary purpose was „to nail down the truth about past criminal events.‟ ”48
McGee “intended to and did elicit statements that [in effect] „do precisely what a witness does on an examination [in court when he] “accuses” a perpetrator of a crime.‟ ”49 Taking all relevant information
38

Id. at 605-06.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
40
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
41
Id. at 600.
42
Id. at 606.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 606. The police officer did give Isaacs what turned out to be his
final opportunity to bear witness against his assailants. Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 607.
48
Id. (quoting People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (N.Y. 2008)).
49
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (quoting Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1027).
39
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into account, the court concluded that the statements made by Isaacs
constituted testimonial hearsay.50
B.

Dying Declarations

Next, the court focused on whether or not the testimonial
statement falls under an exception which may be invoked to admit
these statements against the criminal defendant.51 Hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to various exceptions including the dying
declaration.52 The court focused on this exception since case law
provides that “ „dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the homicide‟ ” when the declarant is the victim.53
The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Crawford did
not clearly define the common-law hearsay exception of dying declarations.54 Instead of following federal precedent, the Appellate Division, Second Department joined the decision of other state courts and
concluded that the Confrontation Clause “ „incorporates an exception
for testimonial dying declarations.‟ ”55 Although the appellant did
not argue that the State Constitution is more protective than the Federal Constitution, the court applied New York law in the Clay decision since citizens are generally afforded more protection under the
State Constitution.56
The court recognized that dying declarations are rooted in
case law such as the New York Court of Appeals decision in People
v. Bradley.57 A fair reading of case law indicates that “the „requisite
state of mind of [the] declarant may be found from all circumstances
surrounding the statement sought to be admitted,‟ and the declarant
need not have „actually expressed a certainty of impending death.‟ ”58
The court recognized that several relevant factors should be consi50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892)).
54
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
55
Id. at 609 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6).
56
Id.
57
862 N.E.2d 79.
58
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (quoting People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 114 (N.Y.
1986)).
51
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dered to determine the state of mind of the declarant, including the
condition of the declarant, the nature and the severity of the wound,
and whether the objective actions are associated with an expectation
of imminent death.59
The court held the high standard that invokes dying declarations was satisfied in Clay since Isaacs made the statement under the
hopeless expectation that death was near at hand.60 Isaacs was shot
six times and the bullets entered through several vital organs as well
as the spinal cord.61 The court concluded that Isaacs made these
statements as his condition was declining.62 After Isaacs identified
his assailant, he was unable to respond to subsequent inquiries due to
the severe nature of his injuries.63 Taking all relevant circumstances
into account, the court affirmed the district court‟s decision to admit
Isaacs‟ statement to Officer McGee as a dying declaration.64

IV.

OVERVIEW
A.

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads, in pertinent part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”65 The right of confrontation mainly serves to secure the criminal defendant the opportunity of
cross-examination.66 Allowing the opportunity for cross-examination
59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. Isaacs was struggling to breathe and was unable to speak after naming “Tom” as the
perpetrator. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 611.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
60
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is significant because it is universally recognized as a primary method for determining the truth. Most legal evidence containing oral
testimony may only be admissible when the statements are subject to
this stringent form of scrutiny.67
As long as the declarant is a witness subject to crossexamination, “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting
the declarant‟s out-of-court statements.”68 The witness is there to testify against the one accused of the crime and must “bear testimony.”69
Testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”70 Under certain circumstances, testimony given by an out-of-court declarant may
be admissible in a criminal proceeding.71 This balances the Confrontation Clause protection with the danger of admitting out-of-court
statements into evidence.72

B.

Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State
Constitution

The New York Constitution contains a Confrontation Clause
counterpart which explicitly states, in pertinent part, “[i]n any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and

with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 157-58 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. 247, 242-43).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 158. The declarant must testify as a witness and be subject to full crossexamination. Id.
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, the „greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth;‟ (3) permits the jury that is to decide
the defendant‟s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making
his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
Green, 399 U.S. at 158. However, “the out-of-court statement may have been made under
circumstances subject to none of these protections.” Id.
69
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 59.
72
Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
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defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted
with the witnesses against him or her.”73 Although criminal defendants in New York may allege violations under both the federal and
state constitutions, they are subject to the same interpretation.74

V.

THE DYING DECLARATION HEARSAY
EXCEPTION

Dying declarations are a long recognized exception to the
hearsay rules in the United States court systems and date back to the
middle of the 18th century.75 This exception to the hearsay rule admits dying declarations in homicide cases under certain circumstances when the deceased made a declaration identifying the perpetrator after receiving the fatal blow.76 For a statement to be
introduced into evidence as a dying declaration, the declarant must be
unavailable and must identify the perpetrator under the sense of impending death where there is absolutely no chance of recovery.77 It is
not sufficient if the declarant makes the statement under the assumption that death is possible or even likely.78 A number of factors must
be considered in assessing whether the statement was made under the
certainty of impending death including the improvement or decline of
the condition, the nature and severity of the declarant‟s injuries, and
whether or not actions were taken which are generally associated
with an expectation of imminent death.79

73

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 80.
75
See Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
76
King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-54 (1789); King v. Reason, 93 Eng. Rep.
659, 661 (1722).
77
Mattox, 146 U.S. at 151. Statements made with the belief that death is near are deemed
to be truthful, similar to a statement made under oath. Id. at 152.
78
Nieves, 67 N.E.2d at 113.
79
Id. at 114.
74
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The Federal Courts’ Application of Dying
Declarations

Dying declarations are deeply rooted in our justice system and
have a long history of recognition by the United States Supreme
Court.80 In 1892, the Court in Mattox v. United States81 stated, “dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of
the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of
the defendant as well as against him.”82 The Court held that the party
attempting to introduce these declarations into evidence must show
these statements were made under a sense of impending death due to
the nature and extent of the injuries or the conduct and communication made by the victim as well as any medical personnel.83
Five years after the Court‟s decision in Mattox, it faced
another dying declaration issue in Carver v. United States.84 The
Court recognized that dying declarations are an exception to the general rule that only sworn testimony can be received since the fear of
impending death can be assumed to be as powerful as the obligation
of an oath.85 Also, the Court noted that the dying declarations are
admissible “to prevent an entire failure of justice, as it frequently
happens that no other witnesses to the homicide are present.”86
The Supreme Court clarified the situations where dying declarations may be admissible in Shepard v. United States.87 Shepard
was convicted for the murder of his wife by mercury poisoning.88
The trial court admitted the evidence of the victim‟s statement, “Dr.
Shepard has poisoned me” and appellant contended it error to admit
this evidence as a dying declaration.89 The Court held that the declarant spoke with the hope of recovery since her illness began on May
20th and she showed great improvement until almost a month later
80

See Mattox, 146 U.S. at 151 (noting that dying declarations are admissible in murder
trials under certain circumstances).
81
146 U.S. 140 (1892).
82
Id. at 151.
83
Id. Medical personnel on scene may inform the victim about the severity of his or her
condition. Id.
84
Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897).
85
Id. at 695-96.
86
Id. at 697.
87
Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
88
Id. at 97.
89
Id. at 98.
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when she died on June 15th.90 There was no indication that the
statement would be used to charge her husband with murder; rather,
she spoke as an ill woman voicing her beliefs and conjectures of the
present moment.91 The Court recognized that “[h]omicide may not
be imputed to a defendant on the basis of mere suspicions, even when
they are the suspicions of the dying.”92 In order to admit the declaration into evidence, there must be personal knowledge as to the acts
that are declared.93
More recently, the Second Circuit confronted a dying declaration issue in Rao v. Artuz.94 Rao was convicted of murder in the
second degree due to the shooting death of Harold Gillard.95 Rao
contended on appeal that Gillard‟s dying declarations were improperly admitted at trial in violation of the Confrontation Clause.96 After
Gillard was shot, he stated that the perpetrator was “the fat man” who
“works for a fellow named Vinnie.”97 The Second Circuit upheld the
admission of this testimony as a dying declaration.98
The Southern District of New York applied the dying declaration exception in Paul v. Ercole99 and Figueroa v. Ercole.100 In Paul,
Thompson was the victim of a shooting who stated, “Jermaine, he
shot me . . . Mom, Dreds did it. I‟m going to die.”101 The court held
that the victim‟s dying declaration met the criteria for admissibility
since the statement was made “with an awareness of impending
death” and was presumed to be reliable.102 Conversely, in Figueroa
v. Ercole, the Southern District of New York held that the statement
90

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
92
Shepard, 290 U.S. at 101.
93
Id.
94
No. 97-2703, 1999 WL 980847 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 1999).
95
Id. at *1. Edward Jordan shot Gilliard, but Rao was convicted under the theory that he
hired Jordan to kill Gillard because of a debt. Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Rao, 1999 WL 980847, at *2. The court admitted the dying declaration only for the
purpose of identifying the assailant. Id. The court did not allow this evidence for other purposes including the fact that the victim believed he was shot because of a debt or to infer that
someone other than the gunman was involved in the shooting. Id.
99
No. 07 Civ. 9462, 2010 WL 2899645 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010).
100
No. 10 Civ. 3262, 2011 WL 3359682 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011).
101
Paul, 2010 WL 2899645, at *1-2.
102
Id. at *3. There were also three other witnesses to the crime who corroborated the dying declaration evidence. Id. at *2.
91
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made by the declarant was not admissible as a dying declaration.103
Figueroa shot a man named Pressley twice where one bullet entered
the abdomen and the other bullet grazed his leg.104 Pressley‟s breathing returned to normal and he appeared lucid as he was being transported to the hospital.105 Pressley stated, “I don‟t know who did this
to me. I don‟t know nothing,” and died from the wounds a few hours
later.106 Figueroa attempted to admit this statement as a dying declaration.107 The trial court denied the motion and found that Pressley
did not believe that he was going to die when the statement was made
since the majority of his wounds were internal and he could not have
known their severity.108
The Southern District of New York decided a case very similar to the facts of Clay in Nesmith v. Bradt.109 Scott was shot three
times and the injuries from the wounds caused his demise.110 When
police officials arrived on scene, Scott informed them that “T” shot
him and explained to one officer that “T” was “Terrence from
Soundview.”111 The trial court admitted the statements by the police
officers into evidence as dying declarations and the appellate court
affirmed the decision.112

B.

The New York Courts’ Application of Dying
Declarations

The New York courts have interpreted Article 1, Section 6 of
the State Constitution to permit dying declarations into evidence in
certain situations where a fatally wounded victim utters the name of
the perpetrator with his or her dying breath.113 The New York Court
103

Figueroa, 2011 WL 3359682, at *1.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Figueroa, 2011 WL 3359682, at *1. The only visible wound was small in size and not
life threatening. Id.
109
Nesmith v. Bradt, No. 08 Civ. 6546, 2009 WL 3189346 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009).
110
Id. at *1.
111
Id. The victim made the same statement to three different police officers who arrived
at the scene. Id.
112
Id. at *3.
113
People v. Falletto, 96 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1911).
104
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of Appeals also recognized that in every specific case, the statement
made by the declarant must be viewed “through a multifaceted prism
that properly reflects the „core‟ evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent.”114 The Confrontation Clause was adopted with
the intent to disallow the use of an ex parte examination into evidence
against a criminal defendant.115
In New York, dying declarations are admissible in a criminal
prosecution when the declarant‟s statements concerning his or her
own death are uttered “with no hope of recovery.”116 The statements
must be made by the victim of an assault who has the “ „hopeless expectation that death is near at hand‟ ” and this is the final opportunity
to disclose the identity of the assailant.117 The Court of Appeals has
historically been skeptical about the validity of dying declarations for
two reasons.118 First, dying declarations are hearsay. 119 Second, it is
difficult to prove with certainty that the declarant had no hope of recovery.120
The New York Court of Appeals recognized a clear distinction between evidence such as business records permitted into evidence since they are independent and objective tests as opposed to
second hand testimony given by an individual who may be powered
by motives other than justice.121 There is a question of the reliability
and authenticity of the statement that is made under suspicion or conjecture, especially when the victim is not seen by the jury and subject
to cross-examination.122
Another significant issue with this hearsay exception is that it
must be proven with certainty that the dying declaration was made
under a sense of impending death and the declarant made these
statements under the belief that there was absolutely no chance of recovery.123 This issue arose in Nieves where the victim was hospita114

Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1029.
Id.
116
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 113.
117
Id. (quoting Shepard, 290 U.S. at 100).
118
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
People v. Allen, 90 N.E.2d 48, 50-51 (N.Y. 1949).
122
Id. at 51.
123
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 113. This is an evidence issue and it is difficult to prove this
element when the declarant is deceased and not available to testify. Id. at 114. The court
115
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lized with only one stab wound.124 The doctor believed that her condition was stabilizing or improving at the time the victim made the
statement that asserted the identity of the person who perpetrated the
assault.125 Despite the fact that the wound was fatal, it was not an injury where the victim would believe that death was imminent.126 In
order for a statement to be admitted into evidence as a dying declaration, the standard of proof set out by the New York Court of Appeals
must be satisfied.127 An important element in this standard of proof
requires that the declarant must believe death was close at hand.128 In
Nieves, the court determined that this high standard of proof was not
satisfied since it is unlikely that the declarant believed she was going
to suffer imminent death from her relatively minor injuries.129
In contrast to Nieves, the court in Clay concluded that Isaacs
identified his assailant under a sense of impending death.130 Isaacs
was mortally wound and suffering severely from six gunshot
wounds.131 The bullets entered Isaacs‟ abdomen, back, and chest
cavity, puncturing his kidney, liver, small and large intestines, and
the right lung.132 The bullets also fractured two vertebrae and the
spinal cord.133 At the time Isaacs made the statement to McGee, he
was struggling to breathe and his condition was rapidly declining.134
Isaacs was in such a devastatingly poor state that immediately after
he uttered the name of the man who shot him, he was unable to speak
any further.135 Even though there were no medical professionals on
scene, Isaacs was informed by an officer that he would not survive
the gunshot wounds.136 Additionally, Isaacs was shot at a very close
range which indicated that the identification was made based on seelooks to the nature and severity of the wounds as well as the actions of the declarant. Id.
124
Id. at 110.
125
Id. at 111.
126
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 114.
127
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
128
Id.
129
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 114.
130
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
136
Id. Although there were no medical personnel on scene to inform the victim of his
condition, the officer explained the severity of his injuries. Id.
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ing the assailants face up close, rather than conjecture or suspicion.137
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the decision
that the statement made by Isaacs identifying Thomas Clay as the
murderer was appropriately admitted as a dying declaration.138

VI.

THE TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT

There is a “core class” of testimonial statements which includes ex parte in court testimony, affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, confessions, and statements taken by law enforcement through
the course of formal police interrogations.139 These statements are
formal testimonial material “that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reason[ ] to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”140
Historically, testimonial statements were not permitted unless
the declarant was unable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was
made.141 There is an express indication that the prior opportunity for
cross-examination was a dispositive requirement and was necessary
in order for the testimonial statements to be admissible.142 In situations where the defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination,
the testimony was excluded when the government failed to establish
unavailability of the witness.143
The Supreme Court addressed the Confrontation Clause directly in Ohio v. Roberts.144 There, the Confrontation Clause of the

137
Id. at 610-11. Even if the victim makes the statement identifying his assailant when he
or she is near death, it is not sufficient if these statements are made under conjecture or suspicion. Id.
138
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
139
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
140
Id. at 52.
141
Id. at 53-54.
142
Id. at 55-56.
143
Id. at 57. The unavailability of a witness is simpler to establish when the witness is
deceased as opposed to circumstances where the witness voluntarily does not appear to testify. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 402 (2008) (discussing the forfeiture theory which
arises when a criminal defendant murders the witness to ensure he or she would be unavailable to testify in court against the defendant).
144
448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Sixth Amendment145 was interpreted by the Court to provide that if a
witness is unavailable to testify against a criminal defendant, the
statement may be admitted if it has an “adequate indicia of reliability.”146 A statement may be admitted as evidence if it bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” or falls under the “firmly
rooted hearsay exception.”147 This interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment was exceedingly vague and constitutional concerns developed as to whether the rules of evidence involving hearsay dissipated under a newly formed and overly broad hearsay exception.148
In Crawford v. Washington,149 the Supreme Court‟s focus
shifted from the amorphous reliability standard of Roberts to the concept of testimonial.150 The Court in Crawford explicitly stated that
when testimonial evidence is at issue, the Confrontation Clause requires that the prosecutor produce the declarant for in court crossexamination or show unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.151 The Court in Crawford did not
provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” statements.152
However, the Court did indicate that at bare minimum, it applies to
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial, and to police interrogations.”153
The Court in Davis further defined testimonial statements
when it established the primary purpose test which provides that
statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish factual evidence that may be potentially relevant in a criminal prosecution rather than obtaining information to meet an ongoing
emergency.154 However, the Court in Davis did not produce an “exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements.”155
145

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
147
Id.
148
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1028. “Involvement of government officers in the production
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.” Id.
at 1026 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7).
149
Crawford, 541 U.S.36.
150
Id. at 68.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
155
Id. at 822.
146
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The Supreme Court most recently defined testimonial statements in Michigan v. Bryant.156 The Court noted that whether an ongoing emergency exists is a “highly context-dependant inquiry” and
the word “emergency” is not limited to the victim but may extend to
the safety of the public.157 The Court also noted that whether an ongoing emergency exists is only one factor in determining the primary
purpose of the interrogation.158 Other factors include the medical
condition of the victim, the informality of the encounter, and the
statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators.159 The
ultimate inquiry used to determine whether a statement is testimonial
is the primary purpose of the interrogation.160

A.

Federal Courts’ Determination Whether
Statements Are Testimonial
1.

Crawford v. Washington

The Supreme Court in Crawford recognized the difficulty in
distinguishing between statements which are testimonial and those
which are not testimonial.161 The Court recognized that police attempts to obtain information initially to provide emergency assistance
may progress into an investigation into past events thereby producing
testimonial statements.162 A statement is testimonial when under the
particular circumstances, the primary purpose of the questioning
viewed objectively is to learn information that is or may potentially
be relevant to a criminal prosecution.163 In contrast, a statement is
not testimonial when it is made under circumstances which objectively indicate that the primary purpose is to immediately assist with an
156

131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
Id. at 1158.
158
Id. at 1148.
159
Id. at 1160. The factors taken into account must be viewed objectively. Id.
160
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165.
161
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
162
Id.
163
Id. (“They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” (quoting Davis, 547
U.S. at 822)).
157
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ongoing emergency.164 There are situations in which the primary
purpose is distinctly clear.165 However, this may be a fine line which
may often be blurred by a multitude of circumstances.166

2.

Davis v. Washington

In order to clarify the confusion regarding whether a statement is or is not testimonial in nature, the Court in Davis developed
the primary purpose test.167 This analysis takes into account the main
purpose the statement was intended to serve.168 Although this test is
extremely broad and open to interpretation, the Court emphasized
that the primary purpose test is objective.169 The primary purpose test
does not look at the actual or subjective purpose of the individuals
involved.170 Instead, this analysis focuses on the impression that reasonable individuals would have had under the exact circumstances in
which the altercation occurred.171 A statement is generally testimonial when a reasonable individual would believe that the primary purpose of the statement was to act as a witness for criminal prosecution.172 A number of factors must be taken into consideration in order
to determine whether or not a statement is testimonial, including the
existence of an ongoing emergency, the victim‟s condition, the severity of the wounds, the objective statements from the police officer
and the declarant, the safety of the police and the public, the weapon
used in the crime, and the formality of the encounter.173
The Court in Bryant recognized that the existence of an ongoing emergency is a significant factor to take into account.174 However, the existence of an ongoing emergency is merely one factor to be
164

Id. (“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)).
165
Id. at 604.
166
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
167
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
168
Id.
169
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
173
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.
174
Id.
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considered in evaluating the main purpose of the questioning.175 In
Davis, the Supreme Court held that statements made to law enforcement at the actual crime scene during a 911 telephone call did not
constitute testimonial statements because the declarant sought help in
the midst of an emergency situation and was not providing information for use in a court of law.176
There is no bright line that delineates when a statement made
by the declarant is testimonial or not testimonial in nature.177 In
Hammon v. Indiana,178 a companion case to Davis, the police responded to a call which reported a domestic disturbance.179 When the
officers arrived at the scene, a woman was standing outside with a
frightened expression on her face, but she claimed everything was
fine.180 The police entered the home and saw her husband in the
kitchen.181 Some officers questioned the wife in room separate from
her husband, while other officers remained with the husband in order
to prevent him from interfering with the investigation.182 The police
took the wife away for a second time and questioned her with the sole
purpose and intent of investigating a possible crime.183 The statements from the first line of questioning were not testimonial since
they were made to the officers to deal with the present emergency
situation.184 In contrast, the Court held that the statements made to
the police during the second line of questioning were testimonial
since they were made with the intent to gather information pertaining
to a criminal prosecution.185

3.

Michigan v. Bryant

The United States Supreme Court was confronted with a Sixth
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hammon, 547 U.S. at 819-20.
Id. at 830.
Id.
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Amendment Confrontation Clause issue more recently in Michigan v.
Bryant.186 In Bryant, an emergency call was made about a shooting
that took place.187 The police arrived at the scene and found the victim lying on the ground with bullet wounds in his torso.188 When the
victim was questioned about the events, he explained that he had
been shot by a man named Rick.189 The victim provided the location
of the shooting and a physical description of the man who shot
him.190 The victim died a few hours later.191 The police officers testified at trial to the statements made by the deceased regarding the
description of perpetrator.192 The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed and concluded that the statements made by the victim constituted testimonial hearsay.193
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision and provided further clarification of the primary purpose
test.194 The Court ruled that the primary purpose test is objective, and
that the existence of an ongoing emergency, while a significant factor, is not the only factor to be considered under the circumstances.195
Both the actions as well as the statements made by the participants at
the scene of the crime assist in determining the type and scope of
danger existing at the moment, not only to the victim of the crime but
also the police and the public.196 The primary purpose of the interrogation is most accurately determined by both the questions of the officers on scene as well as the victim‟s responses.197
The Supreme Court in Bryant concluded that the victim‟s
statements were not testimonial because the primary purpose was to
meet an ongoing emergency.198 A major factor in this decision was
186

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143.
Id. at 1150.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 1151.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162.
197
Id. at 1160-61. The primary purpose test does not look at the subjective intent or beliefs of the involved parties, but views the situation and the statements from an objective
standpoint. Id. at 1162.
198
Id. at 1164.
187
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the fact that the victim questioned how soon emergency medical services would arrive for assistance.199 These facts suggested that the
victim sought urgent medical assistance with the hope that his condition would be stabilized.200 There is no indication that the victim
made these statements with the primary purpose of providing evidence for a subsequent criminal prosecution of the perpetrator.201
Therefore, under those particular circumstances, the statements made
by the victim in Bryant did not violate the Confrontation Clause.202

B.

New York Approach To Testimonial Statements

The New York Court of Appeals applied the primary purpose
test set out in Davis to analyze testimonial statements in many cases,
including People v. Bradley,203 which had similarities to the facts of
both Davis and Hammon.204 In Bradley, the police arrived on scene
in response to an emergency call and immediately observed a visibly
injured and shaken woman.205 An officer on scene questioned the
woman, who explained that she had been thrown through a glass
door.206 As a result of this assault, the woman suffered severe injuries.207 The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the statement
made by the victim was not testimonial in nature because it was made
to assist with an ongoing emergency and the officer‟s questioning
was designed to prevent the woman from suffering further harm.208
The New York Court of Appeals decided a case with facts
very similar to Clay in People v. Nieves-Andino.209 There, two police
officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they observed the

199

Id. at 1165. The facts indicate that “an armed shooter whose motive for and location
after the shooting were unknown.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164.
200
Id. at 1165.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1166-67.
203
862 N.E.2d 79.
204
Davis, 547 U.S. 813; Hammon, 547 U.S. 813.
205
Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 80.
206
Id.
207
Id. The woman walked with a noticeable limp, bled profusely from her hand and had
blood on her face and clothes. Id.
208
Id. at 81.
209
People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007).
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victim laying the street in between two parked cars. 210 Initially, the
officers summoned an ambulance to the scene and requested from the
victim his name, phone number and address.211 Subsequently, the officers inquired about the shooting and the victim stated that he had
been shot three times by an individual named Bori.212 The court held
that the identification of Bori as the shooter was stated during an ongoing emergency when the primary purpose of the interrogation was
to take action to prevent further harm.213 The court held the statement made by the victim was not testimonial and did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.214
In these cases, the police officers who heard the statements at
issue were the first officers on scene and responsible for determining
the nature and severity of the attack in order to prevent any further
harm.215 In contrast, Officer McGee was not the first police officer to
arrive at the scene of the emergency.216 Isaacs had already spoken
with an officer who was one of the first responders and was aware
that he would not survive.217 Before Officer McGee arrived, a police
van was present as well as other officers who assessed the situation
and acted in a manner to deal with the ongoing emergency.218
Furthermore, the nature of the questioning by Officer McGee
signified that he sought information solely in order to determine the
identity of the person who shot the victim rather than resolve an ongoing emergency.219 McGee did not request the victim‟s name, address, and telephone number as the officers did in Nieves-Andino but
rather approached the victim directly and asked, “Who shot you?”220
Although the officers in both Davis and Bryant made an effort to
learn the identity of the assailant, the questions they asked the victim
were intertwined with a barrage of questions designed to learn about
210

Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1188-89.
212
Id. at 1189.
213
Id. at 1190. The concept of preventing further harm not only applies to the victim but
also the safety of the general public as well as the police officers. Nieves-Andino, 872
N.E.2d at 1190.
214
Id.
215
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 605-06.
220
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06.
211
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the events taking place in the present emergency or to determine the
likelihood of injury to the general public.221 In contrast to the other
officers who made general inquiries about what happened, Officer
McGee asked only one question with the sole intent to learn the identity of the shooter.222 When McGee did not receive a response from
the victim, he told Isaacs, “I don‟t think you are going to make it”
and repeatedly asked who shot him.223
This line of questioning makes clear that the main purpose
was not to deal with a current emergency situation, but to give the
victim a chance to disclose who delivered the fatal blow.224 After
McGee‟s conversation with the victim, he did not alert other officers
of this information to locate the assailant or proceed to secure an ambulance.225 Instead, McGee went to preserve the crime scene from
contamination and to locate possible witnesses to the crime.226
Under these particular circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the primary purpose of Officer McGee was to obtain information to convict the perpetrator in a court of law.227 By applying
the rules set forth by both the United States Supreme Court and the
New York Courts, the statement made by Isaacs to Officer McGee is
testimonial in nature.228

1.

Controversy Related to the Confrontation
Clause Exception for Dying Declarations

Some justices expressed concern about the recent decisions
involving the application of dying declarations as an exception to the
Confrontation Clause.229 This concern arose from the fact that the
focus on whether or not a statement is testimonial seems to eliminate

221

Id. at 606.
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 606-07.
229
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222
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the common law dying declaration hearsay exception.230
In Crawford, Justice Rehnquist noted that there have historically been exceptions to confrontation that make certain out-of-court
statements as reliable as in court testimony subject to cross examination.231 There are instances where statements cannot be replicated in
court but are made under circumstances were the declarant‟s statements are unlikely to be false and admitting these statements furthers
the Confrontation Clause‟s goal of advancing the truth in criminal trials.232 Rehnquist emphasized the fact “[t]hat a statement might be
testimonial does nothing to undermine the wisdom of one of these
exceptions.”233
In Davis, Justice Thomas attacked the primary purpose test set
out by the majority and the vague concept of testimonial statements,
stating the analysis “bears little resemblance to what we have recognized as the evidence targeted by the Confrontation Clause.” 234 The
dissent stated that the Confrontation Clause sought to prevent abuse
by overzealous prosecutors using ex parte statements as evidence
against a criminal defendant, however, this new test also encompasses technically informal statements that may be used to circumvent the literal right of confrontation.
The Court in Giles suggested that a defendant who committed
a wrong forfeits his hearsay rights rather than his rights under the
Confrontation Clause.235 This is because courts have largely excluded hearsay evidence due to the fact that the statements were not
confronted and noted the close relationship between hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause.236 Most recently, in Bryant, Ginsburg raised
the vexing issue of “whether the exception for dying declarations
survives our recent Confrontation Clause decisions.”237 However, the
prosecutor failed to preserve this argument and the United States Su-

230

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
232
Id. This was noted to apply to spontaneous declarations, dying declarations, statements made in the course of obtaining medical services and other hearsay exceptions. Id.
233
Id. The court said that this analysis of testimony excludes at least some of the hearsay
exceptions such as business records and official records. Id. at 76.
234
Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235
Giles, 544 U.S. at 365.
236
Id.
237
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231
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preme Court has yet to directly resolve this question.238
If the view of these justices prevails in future litigation, then it
is likely that the court will alter the primary purpose test and shift the
focus on whether the statement falls under a hearsay exception regardless whether or not the statement was testimonial. Although this
potential change may affect the outcome of many cases, it is likely
that the outcome in Clay would be the same under both the primary
purpose test and the proposed standard set out by the dissenting justices.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of final statements made by a homicide victim may
be accurate and crucial to a conviction in a homicide case. 239 However, no case is exactly like another and it is necessary for each case
to meet the standards set in place to properly allow testimonial hearsay into evidence as a dying declaration. It is important to recognize
that this evidence rests on an assumption which cannot possibly be
regarded with the same value and weight of evidence given in a court
room under all the safeguards provided by cross-examination and
jury observation.240
Under the particular circumstances in Clay, the court was correct in concluding that the statement was testimonial in nature and allowing Officer McGee‟s testimony.241 The statements were made by
the declarant to a late-arriving police officer whose objective behavior indicated that he solicited this information in order to use it as
evidence to prosecute the individual responsible for Isaacs‟ death.242
There was also significant evidence corroborating the dying
declaration.243 The jury also heard testimony from Yvette Clay who
contacted the police the night of the shooting and another eyewitness
who spoke with Isaacs when the shooting occurred.244 Both Yvette
Clay and another witness identified Thomas Clay and Sidor Fulcher
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Id.
People v. Kraft, 43 N.E. 80, 80 (N.Y. 1896).
Id.
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.
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as the shooters while subject to cross-examination in front of a
jury.245 The conversation between Isaacs and McGee was combined
with consistent evidence of Yvette Clay and a separate witness at the
scene of the crime.246 The evidence presented at trial was sufficient
for a jury to convict both defendants for the crime of murder.247 The
Appellate Division, Second Department was correct in its ruling.
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Id.
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
247
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